Signaling Firm Performance Through Financial Statement Presentation: An Analysis Using Special Items by Riedl, Edward & Srinivasan, Suraj
Signaling Firm Performance Through
Financial Statement Presentation:
An Analysis Using Special Items
The Harvard community has made this
article openly available.  Please share  how
this access benefits you. Your story matters
Citation Riedl, Edward J., and Suraj Srinivasan. "Signaling Firm Performance
Through Financial Statement Presentation: An Analysis Using
Special Items." Contemporary Accounting Research 27, no. 1 (spring
2010).
Published Version http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/
j.1911-3846.2010.01010_8.x/full
Citable link http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:29660926
Terms of Use This article was downloaded from Harvard University’s DASH
repository, and is made available under the terms and conditions
applicable to Other Posted Material, as set forth at http://
nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-
use#LAA
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=923898
Signaling Firm Performance Through Financial Statement Presentation:  
An Analysis Using Special Items 
 
Edward J. Riedl * 
Harvard Business School 
 
Suraj Srinivasan 
Harvard Business School 
 
 
ABSTRACT:  This paper investigates whether managers’ presentation of special items within the 
financial statements reflects economic performance or opportunism.  Specifically, we assess 
special items presented as a separate line item on the income statement (income statement 
presentation) to those aggregated within another line item with disclosure only in the footnotes 
(footnote presentation).  Our study is motivated by standard-setting interest in performance 
reporting and financial statement presentation, as well as prior research investigating managers’ 
presentation choices in other contexts.  Empirical results reveal that special items receiving 
income statement presentation are less persistent relative to those receiving footnote presentation.  
These results are consistent across numerous alternative specifications.  Overall, the findings are 
consistent with managers using the income statement versus footnote presentation to assist users in 
identifying those special items most likely to differ from other components of earnings―that is, 
for informational, as opposed to opportunistic, motivations. 
 
 
Keywords:  special items, strategic reporting, presentation, voluntary disclosure, pro forma  
 
 
We thank the following individuals for their useful comments and discussions: Bill Baber, Ray Ball, Phil Berger, 
Mark Bradshaw, Jeffrey Callen (the editor), Patricia Fairfield, Michael Kimbrough, S.P. Kothari, Ben Lansford, Roby 
Lehavy, Asis Martinez-Jerez, Greg Miller, Ray Pfeiffer, Doug Skinner, Mohan Venkatachalam, Jim Wahlen, Greg 
Waymire, two anonymous reviewers, and seminar participants at Georgetown University, Harvard Business School, 
University of Massachusetts – Amherst, Michigan State, the UNC/Duke Fall Camp, Stanford University, and the 
AAA 2006 Annual meeting.  We gratefully acknowledge the contribution of I/B/E/S International Inc. for providing 
earnings-per-share forecast data, available through the International Brokers Estimate System.  These data have been 
provided as part of a broad academic program to encourage earnings-expectation research.  We also thank Claire 
Chiron, Maylene Han, Susanna Kim, and Grace Lin for excellent research assistance.  The paper was previously titled 
“The Strategic Reporting of Special Items: Does Management Presentation Reflect Underlying Firm Performance or 
Opportunism?” 
 
* corresponding author: 
Morgan Hall 365 
Boston, MA 02163 
617.495.6368 
617.496.7363 fax 
eriedl@hbs.edu 
 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=923898
 1
Signaling Firm Performance Through Financial Statement Presentation: 
An Analysis Using Special Items 
   
 
ABSTRACT  
 
This paper investigates whether managers’ presentation of special items within the financial 
statements reflects economic performance or opportunism.  Specifically, we assess special items 
presented as a separate line item on the income statement (income statement presentation) to those 
aggregated within another line item with disclosure only in the footnotes (footnote presentation).  
Our study is motivated by standard-setting interest in performance reporting and financial 
statement presentation, as well as prior research investigating managers’ presentation choices in 
other contexts.  Empirical results reveal that special items receiving income statement presentation 
are less persistent relative to those receiving footnote presentation.  These results are consistent 
across numerous alternative specifications.  Overall, the findings are consistent with managers 
using the income statement versus footnote presentation to assist users in identifying those special 
items most likely to differ from other components of earnings―that is, for informational, as 
opposed to opportunistic, motivations. 
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Signaling Firm Performance Through Financial Statement Presentation: 
An Analysis Using Special Items 
 
1.  Introduction 
 This paper investigates whether managers’ presentation of special items within the 
financial statements reflects informational versus opportunistic motivations.  The presentation 
decision we examine is whether management disaggregates special items as a separate line item on 
the income statement (income statement presentation) or aggregates them into another line item 
with identification only via footnote disclosure (footnote presentation).  Under both presentation 
choices, the special item is recognized, i.e., reflected in net income.  By informational motivations, 
we suggest managers use the income statement versus footnote presentation as a mechanism to 
assist users in better understanding the economic implications of the reported special items.  By 
opportunistic motivations, we suggest managers use this presentation decision to bias perceptions 
of the firm’s performance.   
To distinguish between these motivations, we follow prior research and examine the 
mapping of special items into the firm’s future performance: that is, the persistence of reported 
special items (Burgstahler, Jiambalvo, and Shevlin 2002).  We predict that informational 
motivations are revealed by correspondence between the reporting signal (i.e., the presentation 
choice) and the economic signal (i.e., the economic performance of the reported special items).  
That is, informational motivations suggest that those special items receiving income statement 
presentation are less persistent relative to those receiving footnote presentation.  In contrast, we 
predict that opportunistic motivations are revealed by a lack of correspondence between the 
presentation choice and economic performance of the reported special items.  That is, 
opportunistic motivations suggest that those special items receiving income statement presentation 
are more persistent compared to those receiving footnote presentation.     
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Our study is motivated by academic interest in manager disclosure decisions generally 
(e.g., Healy and Palepu 2001), as well as literature examining disaggregation (Dye and Sridhar 
2004) and the characteristics of permanent versus transitory components of earnings (e.g., Brooks 
and Buckmaster 1976; Elliott and Hanna 1996).  These papers provide evidence that 
disaggregation of elements with differing implications for firm performance improves the 
information set about the firm.  In addition, our paper is motivated by standard-setter interest in 
financial statement presentation, which arises from the flexibility managers have in these reporting 
choices and the potential implications of these choices for financial statement users (FASB 2006; 
IASB 2006).  Consistent with this perspective, our study is also motivated by experimental 
evidence that financial statement presentation choices can affect user judgments (e.g., Hirst and 
Hopkins 1998; Maines and McDaniel 2000).   
We choose managers’ presentation of special items on the income statement as our 
experimental setting for the following reasons.  First, special items have been shown to have 
differing properties relative to other components of income (e.g., Lipe 1986), suggesting 
differential presentation in the financial statements may assist users in understanding their 
properties.  Second, special items have been increasing in frequency and magnitude over time 
(e.g., Elliott and Hanna 1996; see also Appendix A), suggesting they are economically significant 
reporting elements.  Further, financial reporting standards have recently incorporated additional 
reporting elements―particularly those relating to fair value accounting―likely to have similar 
attributes to the special items we examine.1  Third, prior research demonstrates that special items 
are heterogeneous across a number of characteristics (e.g., Francis, Hanna, and Vincent 1996; 
Burgstahler, Jiambalvo, and Shevlin 2002), providing cross-sectional variation that we exploit in 
                                                 
1  For example, special items tend to have lower serial correlation than other components of earnings.  Similarly, 
changes in fair value have (in expectation) low or zero serial correlation.   
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our empirical examination.  Finally, we conjecture that special items provide a strong setting for 
examining motivations underlying managers’ financial statement presentation choices, as the 
reporting of special items typically reflects substantial inherent uncertainty (e.g., the success of a 
restructuring) and measurement error (e.g., estimation of impaired goodwill).  
Our empirical tests use hand-collected data spanning 1993-2002 for a sample of 500 U.S. 
firms within the S&P 1500.  Data are collected to enable measurement of both the specific 
composition of the reported special items as well as the related financial statement presentation 
choice.  We observe considerable variation in the income statement versus footnote presentation of 
special items―both across and within firms.  Overall, empirical results reveal that special items 
receiving income statement presentation are less persistent relative to those receiving footnote 
presentation.  These results are consistent across a number of alternative specifications.  More 
detailed analysis reveals that the lower persistence of special items receiving income statement 
presentation occurs primarily within negative (i.e., income-decreasing) special items, and 
particularly within restructuring and merger and acquisition charges.  If income statement 
presentation is a mechanism for managers to signal earnings components having differential 
properties, and if persistence provides a reasonable measure to capture economic implications of 
reported special items’ for the firm’s future performance, then the relatively lower persistence of 
special items receiving income statement presentation is consistent with managers (on average) 
using the presentation decision for informational, versus opportunistic, motivations.   
Our paper contributes to the accounting literature in three primary ways.  First, we build on 
prior research examining managers’ reporting behavior in other types of financial reporting 
presentation choices, particularly that investigating pro forma reporting (e.g., Schrand and Walther 
2000; Bhattacharya et al. 2003).  A number of these studies conclude that managers act 
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opportunistically in their reporting decisions.  In contrast, our results focusing on a different 
presentation decision―that within the primary financial statements―suggest that managers use 
this presentation consistent with informational motivations.  Second, we build on prior research 
documenting differential properties across special items (e.g., Francis, Hanna, and Vincent 1996; 
Burgstahler, Jiambalvo, and Shevlin 2002) by showing that the properties of special items also 
differ across their presentation within the primary financial statements.  Finally, we provide 
evidence that managers’ presentation decisions for this subset of reporting elements does capture 
differing economic qualities, consistent with observed user behaviors surrounding such decisions 
in experimental settings (e.g., Hirst and Hopkins 1998; Bhattacharya et al. 2007). 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 discusses related prior 
research, motivation, and our hypothesis development.  Section 3 presents the research design.  
Section 4 discusses our sample selection and descriptive data.  Section 5 presents our empirical 
results.  Section 6 provides sensitivity analyses.  Section 7 provides preliminary evidence on the 
market response to this presentation choice.  Section 8 concludes. 
 
2.  Prior Research, Motivation, and Hypothesis Development 
Theory on management disclosure (see Healy and Palepu 2001 for a review) suggests that 
disclosure decisions reflect both informational motivations (that is, managers use these decisions 
to inform financial statement users about the underlying economics of their firms) and 
opportunistic motivations (that is, managers use these decisions to bias users’ perspectives).  
Applying this theoretical framework, the literature examining pro forma reporting suggests that 
managers use discretion for both informational and opportunistic reasons (Bradshaw and Sloan 
2002).  Several papers provide empirical evidence consistent with opportunism.  Schrand and 
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Walther (2000) examines earnings press releases, and documents that managers are more likely to 
separately announce a prior-period gain from the sale of assets than a loss, consistent with 
managers opportunistically selecting the prior-period earnings amount used as a benchmark to 
evaluate current-period earnings.  Similarly, Doyle, Lundholm, and Soliman (2003) finds that pro 
forma items have predictive ability for future cash flows; such predictive power is inconsistent 
with their exclusion from GAAP earnings, and suggestive of opportunistic reporting choices.  
Finally, McVay (2006) documents that managers opportunistically shift reported expenses from 
core expenses (such as cost of goods sold) to special items, thereby overstating “core” earnings.  
Other papers provide evidence supporting both informational and opportunistic motivations 
underlying pro forma reporting choices.  Lougee and Marquardt (2004) finds that firms with low 
GAAP earnings informativeness are more likely to disclose pro forma earnings consistent with 
motivations to accurately reflect the firm’s performance; however, the direction of the GAAP 
earnings surprise is also an important determinant of this decision, consistent with opportunistic 
motivations.  Similarly, Bowen, Davis, and Matsumoto (2005) provides evidence that managers 
emphasize metrics that portray more favorable firm performance; however, these same metrics are 
also more value relevant.   
We build upon this literature by examining an alternative presentation decision.  
Specifically, we examine a presentation choice within the primary financial statements: namely, 
that of disaggregation versus aggregation within the income statement.  Despite significant interest 
by standards setters (FASB 2006; IASB 2006), this presentation decision has received scant 
empirical investigation.  Thus, we build upon notions of disaggregation (e.g., Dye and Sridhar 
2004) to examine managers’ choice to present separately certain elements within the financial 
statements.  Similar to the pro forma literature, our analysis is motivated, in part, by prior 
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experimental research that presentation choices can affect the costs to users to identify, interpret, 
and weigh the implications of reported items for the firm (e.g., Hirst and Hopkins 1998; Maines 
and McDaniel 2000; Elliott 2006).   
Related, we build upon prior research documenting the heterogeneous nature of special 
items.  These papers reveal that special items vary in the bias affecting their recognition (Francis, 
Hanna, and Vincent 1996; Riedl 2004) and in their persistence (Burgstahler, Jiambalvo, and 
Shevlin 2002).  Thus, we combine the voluntary disclosure literature, which generally has not 
examined presentation choices within the financial statements, with the special items literature, 
which documents variation across types of special items, to examine whether special items 
systematically differ across their presentation within the financial statements.   
Our choice of special items is intuitive as an empirical setting for the following reasons.2  
First, proper identification and labeling of this type of charge is likely relevant for financial 
statement users, as these items typically have differing properties from other components of 
earnings (e.g., Lipe 1986; Elliott and Hanna 1996; Fairfield, Sweeney, and Yohn 1996; 
Burgstahler, Jiambalvo, and Shevlin 2002).  Second, special items have increased dramatically in 
frequency and magnitude over recent years (see Appendix A), suggesting these are economically 
significant items for many firms.  Further, special items represent reporting events where 
opportunities to inform or bias perceptions through presentation choice are likely exacerbated, 
owing to the high uncertainty (such as the success of a restructuring endeavor) and challenging 
measurement issues (such as estimating an impairment) typically surrounding them.  Finally, there 
are no rigid guidelines regarding the presentation of such items, except that they must be included 
                                                 
2  Accounting Principles Board 30 – Reporting the Results of Operations defines special items as charges that are 
infrequent or unusual in nature.  Related, our analysis excludes discontinued operations, extraordinary items, and 
effects of changes in accounting principle.  All three qualify for specific treatment under US GAAP: each must be 
disclosed separately, net of applicable taxes, on the income statement below income from continuing operations. 
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in operating income.  Thus, managers have significant discretion over how to present special items 
within the financial statements.3  In particular, managers may present special items in one of two 
ways: disaggregated as a separate line item on the income statement with likely discussion in the 
footnotes (i.e., income statement presentation), or aggregated within another line item on the 
income statement with identification and discussion only via the footnotes (i.e., footnote 
presentation).  In both cases the special items are recognized, i.e., reflected in net income.  The 
manager choice is the mechanism to reveal this: either via the income statement or the footnotes. 
This reporting choice allows managers to signal the economic properties of the special item (e.g., 
whether it is more or less persistent), thus potentially assisting users in determining the 
implications―i.e., the correct weighting―to place on the special item. 
Motivated by theory underlying manager disclosure and presentation choices, our analyses 
examine whether presentation of special items within the financial statements (on average) reflects 
informational versus opportunistic motivations.  The analyses distinguish between these 
motivations by examining the correspondence between the reporting signal for special items and 
their economic characterictics.  Thus, empirically disentangling these motivations requires proxies 
for the reporting and economic signals.  The reporting signal is easily observed: it is the income 
statement versus footnote presentation of the special items.  To capture the economic signal, we 
follow prior research examining properties of special items, which documents that special items 
have lower persistence relative to other income statement reporting elements (Burgstahler, 
                                                 
3    While we explicitly incorporate the magnitude of the special item into our research design, we are unaware of any 
rules imposing an income statement presentation requirement based on materiality.  Firms are required to 
“identify” (i.e., disclose) all material events; however, they have discretion in the presentation decision as it relates 
to the financial statements, including the income statement.  As an example, the SEC raised questions to IBM 
regarding its 1999 annual report, in which IBM aggregated a $4.06 billion gain from the sale of a subsidiary, which 
was identified in the footnotes but presented as an offsetting item within SG&A on the income statement.  
However, the matter was subsequently dropped, and IBM was not required to amend its filings (Bulkely 2002).  
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Jiambalvo, and Shevlin 2002; Doyle, Lundholm, and Soliman 2003).  Accordingly, we employ 
persistence of the special items as the economic signal.4   
Thus, our primary empirical tests compare the persistence of special items receiving 
income statement presentation to that for special items receiving footnote presentation.  We make 
the following two competing predictions.  First, under the informational hypothesis, managers will 
use the presentation decision as a mechanism to signal the economic properties of reported special 
items.  Accordingly, we predict that special items receiving income statement presentation will 
have lower persistence (on average) relative to special items receiving footnote presentation.  For 
example, if managers use income statement presentation to signal differing properties relative to 
other income statement components, then negative special items receiving income statement 
presentation will have lower persistence relative to those receiving footnote presentation.  Thus, 
under the informational hypothesis, we expect to observe correspondence between the reporting 
signal (the presentation choice for the special items) and the economic signal (the persistence of 
the special items).   
Second, under the opportunistic hypothesis, managers will use the presentation decision to 
misrepresent the economic properties of reported special items.  Incentives underlying this 
opportunism may be characterized in two ways.  First, managers have incentives to inflate 
reporting heuristics such as “core earnings” (e.g., due to capital market pressures).  Second, 
                                                 
4   The persistence of special items―i.e., their effect on the firm’s future performance―can manifest in two primary 
ways.  First, additional special items may be reported in the future, consistent with the serial correlation of special 
items documented in prior research (e.g., Elliott and Hanna 1996).  For example, a firm reporting a restructuring 
may incur additional restructuring charges in the future conditional on the success of the initial restructuring; or a 
firm reporting an impairment may require a restructuring of the associated business segment in the future due to 
underperformance.  Second, reported special items may be indicative of generally depressed future economic 
performance, consistent with the underperformance of firms reporting special items (e.g., Elliott and Shaw 1988).  
For example, a firm reporting a substantial impairment may have reduced future revenue and/or depressed 
margins, owing to a shift in the competitiveness of the operations in which the impairment occurred.  These 
situations can result in special items not being (completely) transitory, both with respect to future additional 
special items, as well as future performance generally. 
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managers have incentives to lower such heuristics (e.g., due to political costs for reporting 
excessive earnings).  Restated, incentives to inflate “core earnings” will lead a manager to behave 
opportunistically by mischaracterizing non-persistent positive special items (i.e., gains) as 
persistent via footnote presentation, and to mischaracterize persistent negative special items (i.e., 
losses) as non-persistent via income statement presentation.5  Similarly, incentives to reduce “core 
earnings” will lead a manager to behave opportunistically by mischaracterizing persistent positive 
special items as non-persistent via income statement presentation, and to mischaracterize non-
persistent negative special items as persistent via footnote presentation.  In both instances, this 
leads to a lack of correspondence between the reporting signal and the economic signal.  
Accordingly, under the opportunistic hypothesis, we predict that special items receiving income 
statement presentation will have higher persistence (on average) relative to those receiving 
footnote presentation.6        
We note a potential confound that can affect our inferences.  For a particular subset of 
observations―namely “big bath” observations―opportunism can affect both the presentation and 
recognition of special items.  With regards to our predictions, this subset of observations will have 
a competing inference that our analyses cannot distinguish.  Specifically, under “big bath” 
reporting, managers recognize “excessive” (that is, non-economic) negative special items (e.g., 
Francis, Hanna, and Vincent 1996; Riedl 2004).  These special items are likely to both receive 
income statement presentation (as managers likely wish to frame such charges as non-recurring) 
and be transitory (due to bias introduced in the recognition of these items).  Thus, for the subset of 
“big bath” special items, observed lower persistence for those receiving income statement 
                                                 
5  Note that there are no opportunistic incentives to present persistent positive special items in the footnotes. 
Similarly, there are no opportunistic incentives to present a non-persistent loss on the face of the income statement. 
These cases are “null sets” under opportunistic incentives to inflate core earnings. 
6  Underlying both hypotheses is an assumption that managers perceive that users differentially weigh special items 
across this presentation choice: i.e., that this presentation choice can affect user decisions. 
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presentation cannot distinguish between informational motivations (that is, managers providing 
income statement presentation to alert users to economically more transitory components) versus 
opportunistic motivations (that is, managers providing income statement presentation for special 
items that are biased or non-economic).7  Thus, we first conduct our analyses using all available 
observations; however, due to the above confound, we then exclude “big bath” observations and 
focus our analyses on “non-big bath” observations, which allows cleaner inferences regarding 
informational versus opportunistic motivations.     
 
3.  Research Design 
 We test the above hypotheses as follows.  First, we model the determinants of the 
presentation of special items and test if persistence is a significant determinant.  Second, we 
examine whether the persistence of special items varies across the presentation decision.  We use 
two tests for the following reasons.  The first estimation allows us to model managers’ 
presentation of special items directly using an ex ante measure of managers’ expectation of special 
items’ persistence to distinguish between informational versus opportunistic motivations.  In 
contrast, the second estimation uses an ex post measure of persistence to assess the mapping of 
firm level special items conditional on their presentation into future performance.  Thus, we view 
the two analyses as complementary.  
 
Determinants of Financial Statement Presentation of Special Items 
First, we employ the following regression model to examine the determinants of 
management’s presentation of special items separately on the income statement (income statement 
                                                 
7  Other common earnings management incentives to recognize special items (such as income smoothing) do not lead 
to competing explanations regarding our persistence measure; accordingly, we focus only on the “big bath” notion. 
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presentation) versus aggregated into another line item with identification only via footnote 
disclosure (footnote presentation): 
SI_Sepit = 0 + 1YEARt + 2SIZEit + 3INSTit + 4SI_MAGit + 5IS_DISAGGi 
  + 6SI_PERSISTit + 7NSIit + 8MISS_BENCHit + 9BEAT_BENCHit + it  (1)  
SI_Sep is the percentage of special items reported within a separate line item on the income 
statement for firm i in fiscal year t.  This is measured as the absolute amount of special items 
receiving income statement presentation, divided by the absolute amount of total reported special 
items; thus, the variable ranges in value from 0 to 1, inclusive.  Note that positive (i.e., income-
increasing) and negative (i.e., income-decreasing) special items are not netted in this calculation.8   
The model includes five control variables.  First, we include YEAR (year) as the likelihood 
of presenting special items separately on the income statement may be changing over time; for 
example, pro forma reporting increased over our sample period (e.g., Bradshaw and Sloan 2002).  
Second, we include SIZE (the log of firm i’s year t sales) to control for differing investing and 
information environments across variously sized firms on the presentation decision.  Third, we 
include INST (the percentage of firm i’s common shares outstanding owned by institutions at the 
end of year t, measured using Spectrum), with institutional owners representing sophisticated 
users, which may affect this presentation decision.  However, the effects of YEAR, SIZE and INST 
on this presentation are unclear ex ante; accordingly, we do not predict a sign for δ1, δ2, or δ3.  We 
also include SI_MAG (firm i’s total reported special items for year t divided by beginning market 
value of equity), as the likelihood of reporting special items as a separate line item should be 
                                                 
8    For example, consider a firm having a $40 write-off and $10 gain.  If the firm reports both items separately on the 
income statement, then SI_Sep = 1.00 (50/50).  If the firm reports only the write-off separately, with the gain 
aggregated within another line item, then SI_Sep = 0.80 (40/50).  If the firm reports only the gain separately, with 
the write-off aggregated, then SI_Sep = 0.20 (10/50).  If the firm aggregates both items within other line items, then 
SI_Sep = 0 (0/50).  Thus, we consider all special items as absolute amounts individually to define SI_Sep, as 
netting may obscure presentation differences. 
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increasing in the magnitude of the special item, consistent with materiality affecting management 
presentation decisions.9  Thus, the predicted sign for δ4 is positive.  Finally, we control for the 
firm’s propensity to disaggregate financial information by inclusion of IS_DISAGG, or firm i’s 
income statement disaggregation.  This variable is coded from hand-collected data as follows.  We 
identify all fiscal years within our sample period in which firm i has no reported special items in 
the current or previous two fiscal years.  We then hand-collect the number of line items provided 
on the income statement (excluding sub-totals), and average this for the available years for the 
firm.10  This provides a “base level” of income statement disaggregation by the firm.  If firms 
providing more disaggregated data in general are more likely to provide income statement 
presentation for special items, the predicted sign for δ5 is positive.  
The model includes four experimental variables.  Of primary interest, we examine if the 
economic characteristics of the reported special items affect the presentation decision.  To measure 
this attribute, we follow prior literature (Burgstahler, Jiambalvo, and Shevlin 2002; Doyle, 
Lundholm, and Soliman 2003) and use the special items’ ability to predict the firm’s future 
performance: SI_PERSIST, the special items’ persistence.  This seems warranted, as standard-
setter interest regarding the presentation of financial statement reporting elements in part 
surrounds the correct weighting users should apply with respect to predicting future performance 
(FASB 1980).     
We create an ex ante measure of the managers’ expectation of the persistence of the special 
item by estimating persistence of special items by sign and magnitude at the industry level.  Since 
                                                 
9  Alternatively scaling SI_MAG by lagged total assets or sales does not change the inferences. 
10  The intent of IS_DISAGG is to control for firms’ “normal” level of income statement disaggregation, in the 
absence of reporting special items.  For this reason, we exclude years in which special items are reported to avoid 
confounds that may arise due to the firm choosing a greater level of disaggregation coincident with the reporting of 
the special item.  Similarly, we exclude firm-years in which the firm reported special items up to two years 
previously, owing to the required presentation of three years of income statements for comparative purposes.   
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the reporting of special items tends to cluster within industries, we believe an industry level 
measure is a good proxy for ex ante expectations.  Estimating the model by distinguishing special 
items by sign and magnitude allows the persistence measure to take different values for positive 
versus negative and for small versus large special items.  Thus, empirical implementation of 
SI_PERSIST occurs in the following three steps.  First, we estimate the following model: 
 E*it+1 = 0j + 1jE*it + 2jNSI_Largeit + 3jNSI_Smallit  
       + 4jPSI_Largeit + 5jPSI_Smallit + it        (1a) 
where E* is firm i’s net income less any reported special items;11 NSI_Large (NSI_Small) are firm 
i’s reported income-decreasing special items that are above (below) 5% of lagged total assets; and 
PSI_Large (PSI_Small) are firm i’s reported income-increasing special items that are above 
(below) 5% of lagged total assets.  All variables are scaled by market value of equity at the 
beginning of year t.  This model is estimated by 2-digit SIC industry j using all available 
Compustat observations within our sample period; the within-industry estimation allows the model 
to capture the economics of similar types of firms.  Thus, this model examines the ability of 
current period’s earnings before special items and special items to predict one period-ahead 
earnings within a given industry.  Second, we assign the corresponding industry level estimate of 
the 2, 3, 4, or 5 coefficient by matching on the sign (positive versus negative) and magnitude 
(large versus small, as defined above) of the sample firm’s reported special items.  Third, we scale 
the matched  by the sample firm’s core earnings persistence parameter, obtained from firm-
specific estimation of net income before special items for year t+1 upon net income before special 
items and special items for year t for each of our sample firms over the sample period.  In this 
                                                 
11  We present the primary analyses using special items absent any tax effect, owing to various tax treatments that are 
applied across reported special items (e.g., restructuring charges for severance typically are tax-deductible, while 
goodwill impairments typically are not).  However, inferences are unchanged when we apply a standard tax rate to 
reported special items. 
 15
way, SI_PERSIST captures the persistence of special items for similar firms with similar size and 
signed special items, and also controls for the sample firm’s core earnings persistence.  Thus, 
SI_PERSIST is used to proxy for managers’ expectations regarding the persistence of their 
reported special items.12 
We use SI_PERSIST to identify whether the presentation decision reflects (on average) 
informational versus opportunistic motivations.  Specifically, informational motivations are 
reflected when special items receiving income statement presentation are less persistent than 
special items receiving footnote presentation.  This is because informational motivations result in 
the correspondence between the presentation decision and the economic performance of the 
reported special items.  Thus, informational motivations lead to a predicted negative sign for δ6.  
Alternatively, opportunistic motivations suggest that incentives (such as capital market pressures 
to meet particular benchmarks) lead managers to present special items inconsistent with their 
underlying economic content.  Accordingly, opportunistic motivations are reflected when special 
items receiving income statement presentation are more persistent than those receiving footnote 
presentation.  Thus, opportunistic motivations lead to a predicted positive sign for δ6.   
                                                 
12  As a key variable within equation (1), several research design choices regarding SI_PERSIST warrant discussion.  
First, we could estimate a firm-level model, versus the chosen industry-level model.  We choose not do so, due to 
limitations in the variation of reported special items within firms (e.g., not all firms report large and small, or 
positive and negative, special items within our sample period), which would limit our ability to derive firm-specific 
estimates of 2, 3, 4, and 5.  Second, in allowing the special items parameters to vary, we choose to focus on two 
characteristics: the size and sign of special items, which have been examined in prior research.  We also could 
allow the special items parameters (i.e., ) to vary by the category of special item (e.g., restructuring, write-off, 
other).  However, this would require use of our limited sample of 500 firms, as the categorical decomposition of 
special items across all firms is unavailable electronically for our sample period.  Thus, we trade-off having 
broader firm representation with having more detailed decomposition of special items to derive a proxy of manager 
expectations of special items’ persistence.  Finally, we choose to assess performance through analysis of one-year 
ahead net income.  We choose net income, due to its key role as a performance measure; and we choose the one-
year ahead window as any future implications for special items likely manifest most materially in the immediately 
subsequent fiscal year. 
  We note that results are unchanged using alternative specifications to obtain SI_PERSIST.  These include: 
defining the dependent variable in equation (1a) as net income versus net income before special items; obtaining 
coefficients at the 3-digit SIC level; not scaling SI_PERSIST by the sample firm’s core earnings persistence; and 
winsorizing the distribution of special items parameters.     
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Next, we argue that the presentation of special items also reflects their directional impact 
on net income: that is, whether the special items are income-increasing versus income-decreasing.  
Accordingly, we include NSI, an indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm has negative special 
items, and 0 otherwise.  Prior research suggests negative special items are more transitory than 
positive special items (Burgstahler, Jiambalvo, and Shevlin 2002), and are more likely to be 
separately presented on the income statement (Kinney and Trezevant 1997) and in press releases 
(Weiss 2001), suggesting a positive predicted sign for δ7.  However, management may wish to 
downplay income-decreasing special items (i.e., “bad news” such as write-offs), suggesting a 
predicted negative sign for δ7.  Thus, we do not predict the sign for the coefficient on NSI.   
Finally, we include two alternative proxies to examine opportunistic motivations 
underlying the presentation decision.  Both focus on whether the special item causes the firm to 
miss or beat critical benchmarks, as prior research documents that benchmarks affect the 
recognition of special items (e.g., Moehrle 2002; Riedl 2004) and their presentation in press 
releases (e.g., Schrand and Walther 2000; Lougee and Marquardt 2004), and because managers 
care about meeting benchmarks (Mergenthaler, Rajgopal, and Srinivasan, 2009).  Accordingly, we 
include MISS_BENCH, an indicator variable equal to 1 if the reported special items cause 
operating earnings to fall below any of three benchmarks (prior year operating earnings, analysts’ 
consensus earnings forecasts, or zero earnings), and 0 otherwise.  The predicted sign for δ8 is 
positive, as management would wish to signal that such an item is transitory, and thus should not 
be considered a part of current year’s “core earnings.”  We then include BEAT_BENCH, an 
indicator variable equal to 1 if the reported special items cause operating earnings to be above any 
of the three benchmarks (again, prior year operating earnings, analysts’ consensus earnings 
forecasts, or zero earnings), and 0 otherwise.  The predicted sign for δ9 is negative, as management 
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would wish to de-emphasize that beating a benchmark is attributable to a current year special item 
(similar to Schrand and Walther 2000).  Note that each variable captures specific distributions of 
the net negative and positive special items, respectively.  For example, while all negative special 
items reduce earnings by definition, only a subset will cause the firm to miss any of the indicated 
benchmarks.13  
  
Relative Persistence of Special Items Across Their Presentation in the Financial Statements  
The analysis above uses an ex ante measure of persistence of the reported special item.  In 
the next analysis we use an ex post measure that allows us to examine persistence at the firm level.  
We examine the relative persistence of special items across their presentation in the financial 
statements, using the following regression similar to Burgstahler, Jiambalvo, and Shevlin (2002): 
Eit+1 = 0 + 1E*it + 2SI_ISit + 3SI_FNit + it     (2) 
where Eit+1 is net income for firm i for year t+1; E*it is net income less special items for firm i for 
year t; and SI_ISit (SI_FNit) is reported special items for firm i for year t receiving income 
statement presentation (footnote presentation).  For this analysis we use signed (versus absolute) 
special item amounts.14  All variables are scaled by market value of equity at the beginning of year 
t.  Thus, this analysis examines the predictive content of current period net income and special 
items for future (one-period ahead) net income, conditional on the special items’ presentation.  If 
managers correctly identify ex ante those special items that are economically more transitory, and 
emphasize them via income statement presentation, informational motivations predict 2 < 3.  
That is, special items receiving income statement presentation will have lower persistence relative 
                                                 
13  We do not examine particular contracting incentives (e.g., bonus thresholds for compensation, or debt restrictions 
like covenants) as presentation is unlikely to affect calculations embedded in such contracts. 
14  Equation (1) uses absolute special items to avoid netting in the context of the presentation decision.  The current 
analysis of Equation (2) uses signed special items, which better reflects their mapping into future performance. 
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to those receiving footnote presentation.  Alternatively, opportunistic motivations predict 2 > 3.  
Thus, this analysis uses the ex post mapping of special items into one-year ahead performance to 
disentangle the informational versus opportunistic motivations underlying the presentation 
decision.  
Prior research also suggests that special items, and their mapping into performance such as 
future earnings, vary on a number of dimensions.  To investigate this possibility, we examine the 
following regressions, which further decompose the special items: 
Eit+1 = 0 + 1E*it + 2LARGE_ISit + 3LARGE_FNit + 4SMALL_ISit + 5SMALL_FNit + it  (2a) 
Eit+1 = 0 + 1E*it + 2NSI_ISit + 3NSI_FNit + 4PSI_ISit + 5PSI_FNit + it           (2b) 
Eit+1 = 0 + 1E*it + 2RESTR_ISit + 3RESTR_FNit + 4WO_ISit + 5WO_FNit  
                 + 6ONEG_ISit + 7ONEG_FNit + 8OPOS_ISit + 9OPOS_FNit + it         (2c) 
where E and E* are as defined above.  We provide three additional partitions of special items to 
systematically evaluate whether the presentation varies within the indicated partitions.  Within 
each partition, all variables are scaled by beginning market value of equity.  First, we partition 
based on the magnitude of special item in equation (2a).  Thus, LARGE_IS (LARGE_FN) equals 
firm i’s year t special items receiving income statement (footnote) presentation when firm i’s non-
netted special items divided by beginning market value of equity are above the sample median.  
SMALL_IS (SMALL_FN) equals firm i’s year t special items receiving income statement 
(footnote) presentation when firm i’s non-netted special items divided by beginning market value 
of equity are below the sample median.  This allows us to examine whether the persistence of 
special items varies across the presentation decision within larger special items (2 ≠ 3), and 
within smaller special items (4 ≠ 5). 
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Next, we partition on the special items’ directional impact on reported net income in 
equation (2b), following Burgstahler, Jiambalvo, and Shevlin (2002).  Thus, NSI_IS (NSI_FN) 
equals firm i’s year t special items receiving income statement (footnote) presentation that are 
income-decreasing (i.e., negative).  PSI_IS (PSI_FN) equals firm i’s year t special items receiving 
income statement (footnote) presentation that are income-increasing (i.e., positive).  This allows us 
to examine whether the persistence of special items varies across the presentation decision within 
negative special items (2 ≠ 3), and within positive special items (4 ≠ 5). 
Finally, we partition on the special items’ category in equation (2c), following Francis, 
Hanna, and Vincent (1996).  Thus, RESTR_IS (RESTR_FN) equals firm i’s year t special items 
receiving income statement (footnote) presentation that relate to restructuring charges.  WO_IS 
(WO_FN) equals firm i’s year t special items receiving income statement (footnote) presentation 
that relate to asset write-offs.  ONEG_IS (ONEG_FN) equals firm i’s year t special items receiving 
income statement (footnote) presentation that relate to other special items charges that are income-
decreasing (that is, neither restructuring nor write-offs); principally, these include losses on sales 
of assets, merger and acquisition charges, and write-offs of acquired in-process R&D.  OPOS_IS 
(OPOS_FN) equals firm i’s year t special items receiving income statement (footnote) presentation 
that relate to other special items charges that are income-increasing; principally, these include 
gains on the sale of assets.  This allows examination of special items’ persistence across the 
presentation decision within restructuring charges (2 ≠ 3), within write-offs (4 ≠ 5), within 
other negative special items (6 ≠ 7), and within other positive special items (8 ≠ 9).   
To summarize, the comparison of persistence of special items receiving income statement 
to that for special items receiving footnote presentation enables us to disentangle whether the 
presentation decision reflects informational versus opportunistic motivations.  Under 
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informational motivations, special items receiving income statement presentation (conditional on 
their size, sign, or category) will be less persistent relative to those receiving footnote presentation, 
suggesting _IS coefficients < _FN coefficients (e.g., 2 < 3, 4 < 5, etc.).  Alternatively, under 
opportunistic motivations, special items receiving income statement presentation (again, 
conditional on their size, sign, or category) will be more persistent relative to those receiving 
footnote presentation, suggesting _IS coefficients > _FN coefficients (e.g., 2 > 3, 4 > 5, etc.).  
Thus, we compare the persistence of special items receiving income statement versus footnote 
presentation, holding constant the nature (size, sign, category) of the special items. 
We view the two primary analyses as complementary in the following way.  Equation (1) 
takes persistence as given, and estimates the “persistence” parameter (i.e., estimates the effect of 
persistence on the presentation decision).  In contrast, equation (2) and the related partitions take 
the presentation of special items as given (since this is directly observable), and estimates the 
“presentation” parameter (i.e., it estimates the effect of presentation on persistence).  Use of both 
methods should provide additional robustness to our inferences. 
 
4.  Sample Selection and Descriptive Data 
 Table 1 outlines our sample selection process, in which we randomly select firms to hand-
collect the composition and presentation of special items.  We begin with all U.S. firm-years 
designated within the S&P 1500 during the period 1993 – 2002.  Our restriction to this subset 
enables us to capture a broad cross-section of firms while focusing our analysis on a relatively 
large proportion of U.S. market capitalization.15  Due to the cost of hand-collection of data, we 
randomly choose 500 firms from among all firms that fall within the S&P 1500 during our sample 
                                                 
15  However, use of larger firms will, by definition, limit our ability to generalize to the broader population of firms. 
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period.  For these 500 firms, we include all available firm-years within the sample period, 
resulting in a sample of 4,695 firm-years.16   
We then hand-collect and categorize all special items, including whether they receive 
income statement versus footnote presentation, using the firm’s 10-Ks, annual reports, and/or 10-
Qs.  Our collection includes performing key word searches within electronic source documents, as 
well as scanning management discussion and analysis, the financial statements, and footnotes for 
indications of special items, regardless of whether Compustat reports that the firm has a special 
item.  We hand-collect this data for the following reasons: during this period, major electronic 
sources of special items data (particularly Compustat) do not identify the category of special 
items, they net income-increasing and income-decreasing special items into an aggregate amount, 
and they do not provide information regarding their presentation within the financial statements.17  
 Table 2 provides descriptive data for our sample.  The average firm-year has total assets of 
$8.4 billion, consistent with our self-selection into S&P 1500 firms.  Over half of the observations 
report special items (2,412 out of 4,695, or 51%).  Of the 2,412 reporting special items, 1,279 or 
53% report special items exceeding 1% of lagged total assets―a commonly used threshold to 
define “significant” special items in prior literature.  1,452 or 60% report only negative special 
items, consistent with special items tending to be income-decreasing.  Special items are distributed 
widely across the three primary categories of restructuring charges (46% of observations reporting 
special items), write-offs (34%), and other (71%).18  Finally, there is substantial variation in firms’ 
presentation of special items, with 1,335 or 55% presenting all special items as separate line items 
                                                 
16  Various analyses use a subset of the 4,695 observations; these are noted where appropriate. 
17  We categorize reported special items into three major categories: restructuring, write-offs, and other special items.  
Restructuring subcategories include employee severance, facility closing, other, and restructuring reversals.  Write-
offs subcategories include write-offs of goodwill, intangibles, PP&E, investments, oil and gas properties, software, 
leases, inventory, and other.  Other subcategories include gains on settlements, losses on settlements, in-process 
R&D, gains on sales of assets, losses on sales of assets, merger related costs, and other.   
18  The percentages do not sum to 100%, as a firm may report multiple categories of special items in any given year. 
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on the income statement, 733 or 30% aggregating all special items in other line items on the 
income statement with identification only via footnote disclosure, and 344 or 15% adopting mixed 
presentation.  Interestingly, the average magnitude of special items for observations having only 
footnote presentation is 1.6% of lagged total assets, which again exceeds the above-mentioned 
threshold to define “significant” special items used in prior research.  Finally, note that our 
analyses focus on the variation in the presentation decision, as reflected in the bottom three rows 
and last two columns of Table 2.  
 
5.  Empirical Results  
Descriptive Statistics and Univariate Results  
 Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for the sample used to examine the determinants of 
income statement versus footnote presentation of special items.  This sample focuses on those 
observations reporting special items and having available data for Equation (1) (N = 2,228).  Panel 
A presents means and medians for the regression variables.  Special items are typically reported as 
a separate line item on the income statement (mean of SI_Sep = 0.646), with SI_MAG revealing an 
average magnitude of 4.1% of beginning market value of equity.  Firms on average present almost 
fifteen line items on their income statements (IS_DISAGG = 14.659).  Special items have an 
average persistence (SI_PERSIST) of 0.102, and 86% of observations reporting special items 
report a negative special item (NSI = 0.859).  Almost 29% of observations report negative special 
items that result in the firm missing a benchmark (MISS_BENCH = 0.289), while only 5% report 
positive special items that result in the firm beating a benchmark (BEAT_BENCH = 0.051).  This 
latter is consistent with the generally conservative nature of how special items are reported, 
leading to a higher frequency (and concurrent greater impact on benchmarks) of negative than 
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positive special items.  Panel B presents Pearson correlations, with univariate associations 
generally consistent with our previously discussed predictions.  Of note, SI_PERSIST is 
significantly negatively correlated with SI_Sep (correlation = –0.044).  
Table 4 presents univariate comparisons of observations reporting special items under 
income statement versus footnote presentation; for expositional convenience, we present results 
only for the magnitude of special items (SI_MAG) and our key construct for economic 
performance, the persistence of special items (SI_PERSIST).  We provide statistics for two sets of 
observations.  First, Panel A includes all observations with necessary data (N = 2,228), and reveals 
that special items receiving income statement presentation are significantly larger in magnitude 
(e.g., SI_MAG mean of 0.051 versus 0.018) and less persistent (SI_PERSIST of 0.068 versus 
0.180) than those receiving footnote presentation.  In Panel B, we focus only on “non-big bath” 
observations, to avoid the confounding interpretations relating to “big bath” observations as 
previously discussed.  To empirically identify the “big bath” observations for exclusion (N = 216), 
we impose three criteria: the net special items are income-decreasing; total negative special items 
exceed 5% of lagged total assets; and the firm reports negative net income before special items.19  
The univariate results for the non-big bath observations (N = 2,012) are consistent with those 
presented in Panel A: special items receiving income statement presentation remain larger 
(SI_MAG mean of 0.040 versus 0.016) and less persistent (SI_PERSIST mean of 0.066 versus 
0.182) than those receiving footnote presentation   We now turn to the multivariate analysis for 
further evidence. 
 
                                                 
19  Our univariate and multivariate inferences are unaffected by alternative definitions to identify “big bath” 
observations for exclusion from our primary analyses.  These include: alternative magnitude thresholds to define 
“big bath” special items (e.g., greater than 1% or 2% of beginning market value of equity); alternative scalars to 
assess magnitude (e.g., scaling by total assets or sales); and alternative benchmarks (e.g., requiring that the special 
item causes the firm to miss prior year’s earnings). 
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Determinants of Financial Statement Presentation of Special Items 
 Table 5 presents results from OLS regressions examining the determinants of 
management’s decision to provide income statement versus footnote presentation of reported 
special items.  All standard errors are clustered by firm and control for heteroskedasticity.  
Column (1) presents results for all observations having the necessary data (N = 2,228).  Of the 
control variables, the coefficient on YEAR is significantly negative (–0.009, t-statistic = –2.54), 
suggesting a decrease in the likelihood of special items receiving income statement presentation 
over the sample period.  The coefficient on SIZE is negative and significant (–0.022, t-statistic = –
3.86), consistent with larger firms being less likely to separately present special items.  In addition, 
the coefficient on INST is significantly positive (0.179, t-statistic = 3.99), consistent with 
managers being more likely to separately present special items as institutional ownership 
increases.  Finally, SI_MAG is positively associated with this decision (0.668, t-statistic = 5.28), 
consistent with materiality affecting the presentation decision, as larger special items are more 
likely to receive income statement presentation.  IS_DISAGG is insignificant.   
Regarding our experimental variables, SI_PERSIST is negative and significant as predicted 
(coefficient = –0.009, t-statistic = –2.19), indicating managers are more likely to provide income 
statement presentation for those special items having lower persistence.  This is consistent with 
managers being able to identify more transitory special items ex ante, and using income statement 
presentation to signal those special items that are more likely to be transitory (i.e., for 
informational motivations).  In addition, NSI is positive and significant (coefficient = 0.122, t-
statistic = 4.24), indicating that ceteris paribus managers are more likely to present negative 
special items separately on the income statement than positive special items (e.g., Kinney and 
Trezevant 1997).  Of the reporting incentive variables, only MISS_BENCH is significantly 
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positive as predicted (coefficient = 0.100, t-statistic = 4.45), indicating that managers are more 
likely to provide income statement presentation for special items that cause current year’s earnings 
to fall below previous year’s earnings, analysts’ consensus forecasts, or zero earnings (e.g., 
Schrand and Walther 2000).  This is consistent with managers using income statement 
presentation to signal negative special items that affect relevant benchmarks (i.e., for opportunistic 
motivations).20  However, BEAT_BENCH is insignificant and obtains the opposite to predicted 
sign (coefficient = 0.077, t-statistic = 1.53).   
The above results reveal that special items presented on the income statement are less 
persistent than those presented in the footnotes.  This is consistent with the presentation choice 
reflecting informational motivations: that is, it reflects a correspondence between the presentation 
of the special items and their economic content.  However, as previously discussed,  observations 
reflecting “big bath” reporting incentives have two competing explanations.  Thus, for the subset 
of “big bath” observations, the documented lower persistence of special items receiving income 
statement presentation cannot disentangle the opportunistic motivation (that of highlighting non-
economic transitory charges) from the informational motivation (that of highlighting economic 
transitory charges).  However, “non-big bath” observations should not be affected by this 
confound.  Accordingly, to minimize ambiguous inferences underlying this presentation decision, 
we apply a screen to eliminate observations likely to reflect “big bath” incentives, and thus focus 
the analysis on “non-big bath” observations.  Similar to Table 4, the eliminated “big bath” 
observations satisfy the following three criteria: the net special items are income-decreasing; total 
negative special items exceed 5% of lagged total assets; and the firm reports negative net income 
before special items.  Column (2) of Table 5 presents the OLS results for the subset of “non-big 
                                                 
20  We alternatively estimate three separate regressions, sequentially defining MISS_BENCH to equal 1 if the reported 
special items cause the firm’s net income to be below prior year’s net income, analysts’ consensus earnings 
forecasts, and zero net income (e.g., Doyle and Soliman 2002).  Inferences are unchanged. 
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bath” observations (N = 2,012).  Results for the control variables are similar to those reported 
above: the coefficients for YEAR and SIZE are significantly negative, significantly positive for 
INST and SI_MAG; and insignificant for IS_DISAGG.  Similarly, results for the experimental 
variables are unchanged: SI_PERSIST (coefficient = –0.012, t-statistic = –2.77), NSI (0.107, t-
statistic = 3.64), and MISS_BENCH (0.127, t-statistic = 5.03) are significant as above.  Since this 
subsample reasonably identifies observations unlikely to be affected by “big bath” reporting 
incentives, the results regarding SI_PERSIST are consistent with the presentation decision 
reflecting informational motivations, without a confounding interpretation of opportunistic 
reporting and presentation that may underlie “big bath” special items.   
 
Relative Persistence of Special Items Across Their Presentation in the Financial Statements 
Table 6 presents results from analyses examining special items’ ability to predict future 
earnings, conditioned on their presentation in the financial statements; that is, the relative 
persistence of special items receiving income statement versus footnote presentation.  Column (1) 
provides a base regression, revealing that special items (SI, coefficient = 0.177) have significantly 
lower persistence than earnings before special items (E*, 0.910) in predicting one-year ahead 
earnings, consistent with prior research (e.g., Burgstahler, Jiambalvo, and Shevlin 2002) 
(untabulated difference is significant at the less than 1% level).   
Columns (2) through (5) then provide results from the systematic decomposition of special 
items by their presentation as well as other common characteristics of special items examined in 
prior research.  First, column (2) reveals that special items receiving income statement 
presentation (SI_IS, coefficient = 0.163) are significantly less persistent than those presented in the 
footnotes (SI_FN, 0.296) (F-value on difference = 5.06).  This is consistent with the presentation 
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decision reflecting informational motivations: that is, special items receiving income statement 
presentation are less persistent than those receiving footnote presentation, as reflected in their ex 
post mapping into the subsequent year’s earnings.   
Next, column (3) presents results partitioning special items on both their presentation and 
magnitude.  Within larger special items (i.e., defined as above the sample median), those receiving 
income statement presentation (LARGE_IS, coefficient = 0.166) are significantly less persistent 
than those receiving footnote presentation (LARGE_FN, 0.282) (F-value on difference = 3.58).  
Similarly, within smaller special items (i.e., defined as below the sample median), those receiving 
income statement presentation (SMALL_IS, –0.021) are significantly less persistent than those 
presented in the footnotes (SMALL_FN, 0.401) (F-value on difference = 3.38).  Thus, differences 
in persistence appear robust across sizes of special items. 
Column (4) then presents results partitioning special items on both their presentation and 
sign; that is, whether the special items are income-decreasing or income-increasing.  For negative 
(i.e., income-decreasing) special items, those receiving income statement presentation (NSI_IS, 
0.145) are significantly less persistent than those receiving footnote presentation (NSI_FN, 0.311) 
(F-value on difference = 6.85).  However, for positive (i.e., income-increasing) special items, 
those receiving income statement presentation (PSI_IS, 0.311) are less persistent than those 
presented in the footnotes (PSI_FN, 0.410), but the difference is insignificant (F-value = 0.38).  
Thus, it appears differences in persistence are driven primarily by negative special items. 
Finally, column (5) presents results partitioning special items based on both their 
presentation and category.  For this analysis, categories are defined as restructuring, write-offs, 
other negative special items, and other positive special items.  Within restructuring charges, those 
receiving income statement presentation (RESTR_IS, 0.142) are significantly less persistent than 
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those receiving footnote presentation (RESTR_FN, 0.436) (F-value on difference = 2.62).  For 
special items that are write-offs, those presented on the income statement (WO_IS, 0.123) appear 
slightly more persistent than those receiving footnote presentation (WO_FN, 0.111), though the 
difference is insignificant (F-value = 0.01).  Within other special items that are negative (i.e., 
income-decreasing), those receiving income statement presentation (ONEG_IS, 0.209) are 
significantly less persistent relative to those presented in the footnotes (ONEG_FN, 0.643) (F-
value = 5.62).  Finally, among other special items that are positive (i.e., income-increasing), those 
receiving income statement presentation (OPOS_IS, 0.333) appear less persistent than those 
receiving footnote presentation (OPOS_FN, 0.447), but the difference is insignificant (F-value = 
0.48).  Overall, results from the categorical decomposition suggest that differences in persistence 
are driven primarily by restructuring charges and other special items that are income-decreasing, 
where the latter include primarily losses on sales of assets, and merger and acquisition charges 
(including write-offs of acquired in-process R&D).   
Our primary tabulation of Table 6 includes all observations with available data to maintain 
the full distribution of observations.21  However, because of the previously discussed concerns on 
inferences surrounding “big bath” observations, we similarly verify the robustness of our results 
by re-estimating all Table 6 regressions excluding “big bath” observations, employing the same 
definition as within Table 5.  Untabulated results are unchanged from those reported in Table 6 
with three exceptions: differences for small special items in column (3) and for restructuring 
charges in column (5) remain negative as presented, but are now insignificant; and the difference 
for positive special items in column (4) remains negative, but now attains significance.   
 
                                                 
21  Note also that Table 6 includes firm-years reporting no special items.  Such observations are excluded in the Table 
5 analyses as there is no value for the dependent variable, SI_Sep. 
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6.  Sensitivity Analyses  
 In this section, we perform a number of sensitivity analyses.  First, we estimate logistic 
regressions to examine whether results are sensitive to specification of the dependent variable.  
Second, we examine the robustness of the results to additional partitions on the magnitude of 
special items.  Third, we examine the impact of monitoring on the presentation of special items.  
Fourth, we investigate alternative specifications to accommodate potential changes in sample 
characteristics over the time period of the study.  Fifth, we examine a further decomposition of 
special items into sub-categories.   
 
Logistic Regressions 
The dependent variable from equation (1), SI_Sep, has significant clustering at the end 
points of its distribution.  To accommodate this distribution, we alternatively examine a logistic 
specification.  Using equation (1), we re-define SI_Sep to be an indicator variable equal to 1 when 
any reported special items receive income statement presentation, and 0 when all reported special 
items receive footnote presentation.  This is akin to suggesting that the highlighting of any special 
item on the income statement may be a mechanism employed by managers to signal a “red flag” 
for users to look for other related items.  All other variables are unchanged from their previous 
definitions.  Table 7 Panel A presents the results.  Column (1), focusing on non-big bath 
observations (N = 2,012), reveals similar inferences to those of Table 5.  In particular, 
SI_PERSIST remains significantly negative (coefficient = –0.048, Wald-statistic = –4.55).   
We then estimate a second logistic regression, wherein we eliminate observations having 
mixed presentation; that is, we exclude observations wherein some special items receive income 
statement presentation and some receive footnote presentation (N = 311).  This exclusion is 
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justified, as attributing observations with mixed presentation to either the 1 condition (i.e., income 
statement presentation) or the 0 condition (i.e., footnote presentation) for the logistic regression 
can result in measurement error in the dependent variable.  Results are presented in column (2) of 
Table 7, and remain unchanged.  The primary experimental variable, SI_PERSIST, is again 
negative and significant (coefficient = –0.058, Wald-statistic = –6.28).  Overall, Panel A of Table 
7 suggests inferences are robust to alternative specifications of the dependent variable.  
 
Partitions on the Magnitude of Special Items 
We next consider whether our results are robust across various size partitions of special 
items.22  Our primary regressions control for the magnitude of special items in two ways: first, via 
inclusion of the magnitude of special items as a control variable (SI_MAG); second, by allowing 
the expected persistence parameter, SI_PERSIST, to vary by the size of the special items (see 
related discussion in section 3).  However, it is possible these research designs do not fully control 
for differences in the magnitude of special items; and, accordingly, the association between 
SI_PERSIST can vary further depending on the magnitude of special items.  To investigate this 
possibility, we partition the sample observations into two equal size groups: those with special 
items (scaled by market value of equity) above versus below the sample median.  We then re-
estimate the OLS regressions of equation (1) on each subsample.  The results are presented in 
Panel B of Table 7, with column (3) reflecting observations above the sample median, and column 
                                                 
22  We also split our “non-big bath” sample (N = 2,012) into three groups of observations: those in which the special 
item causes the firm to beat prior year’s earnings (N = 88); those in which the special item causes the firm to miss 
prior year’s earnings (N = 247); and those having no benchmark effect (N = 1,677).  We then re-estimate equation 
(1) separately for each sub-sample.  For the beat benchmark sample, SI_PERSIST is negative but insignificant (t-
statistic = –0.92).  For the miss benchmark sample, SI_PERSIST is negative but insignificant (t-statistic = –0.18).  
We note that the smaller sample sizes for these two tests make inferences difficult due to possible lack of power.  
For the no benchmark sample, SI_PERSIST is negative and significant (t-statistic = –2.44).  Of note, the latter 
provides corroborating support for our informational motivation inference, as the no benchmark sample removes 
those observations most likely to have opportunistic incentives to present special items coinciding with missing or 
beating particular benchmarks.  
 31
(4) observations below the median.  The results are robust across both partitions.  Of primary 
interest, SI_PERSIST is marginally significantly negative for special items above the median 
(coefficient = –0.011, t-statistic = –1.78), and significantly negative for special items below the 
median (–0.013, t-statistic = –2.57).  Further, the average magnitude of special items is 4% (1%) 
of beginning market value of equity for special items above (below) the sample median, 
suggesting both groups reflect economically significant special items.  Overall, these results 
further suggest inferences are robust across various size partitions of special items.23        
 
Alternative Measures of Monitoring 
We next consider whether the type of monitoring influences the presentation decision.  
Specifically, we consider two common measures of monitoring: a measure of corporate 
governance, and auditor type.  Regarding the governance measure, we include in equation (1) the 
variable GINDEX.  This variable is obtained from Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003); larger 
values correspond to weaker governance.  We partition the sample observations into those above 
versus those below the median value of GINDEX, and estimate equation (1) as a stacked 
regression model to compare the associations across the two subsets of observations.  Untabulated 
results reveal SI_PERSIST is negative and significant for the subsample having stronger 
monitoring (i.e., below median value GINDEX); is negative but insignificant for the subsample 
with weaker monitoring; and the difference between the two is insignificant.  However, we note 
that GINDEX is unavailable for approximately 25% of the overall sample, limiting the power of 
the analyses.  Regarding auditor type, we also examine whether type of auditor affects the 
                                                 
23  We conduct two alternative specifications to examine the robustness of our results to the size of special items.  
First, we employ terciles based on the magnitude of special items.  Second, we incorporate into equation (1) an 
interaction between SI_PERSIST with an indicator variable equal to 1 for special items above the median.  
Inferences are unchanged across these alternative specifications. 
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motivations underlying the presentation of special items.  However, consistent with our self-
selection into larger firms, we observe little variance in this construct: 98.4% of our sample are 
audited by large (i.e., “Big 4” or “Big 6”) auditors.  These results provide limited evidence that the 
presentation of special items reflects informational motivations for those firms with stronger 
monitoring; results for firms having weaker monitoring are inconclusive.     
 
Alternative Specifications to Accommodate Changes over the Sample Period 
 Equation (1) includes the variable YEAR to control for changes in the presentation of 
special items over time.  However, this variable controls for slope effects.  We consider three 
alternative specifications to accommodate other potential shifts that may occur over the sample 
period.  First, we estimate a fixed effects model, including indicator variables for each year to 
capture mean differences in managers’ presentation of special items over the sample period.  
Untabulated results are unchanged from those reported.  Second, we investigate a random effects 
model.  Untabulated results comparing coefficients and significance levels across the fixed versus 
random effects models reveal minimal differences; a related Hausman test (Kennedy 1998) 
comparing the two sets of coefficients produces a highly insignificant Chi-square, consistent with 
results being invariant to the fixed versus random effects specification.  Finally, we estimate Fama 
and MacBeth (1973) annual regressions; again inferences are unaffected.  These analyses suggest 
that time-varying effects are not driving the reported results.24  
 
Decomposition of Special Items into Sub-Categories 
                                                 
24  To isolate the initial presentation decision, we re-estimate equation (1) on the sub-sample of firms reporting special 
items for the first time during our sample period.  To identify “first time” reporters, we require either (1) that the 
firm did not exist prior to 1993, or (2) if it did exist prior to 1993, it did not report a special item in the five year 
period 1988-1992.  Results for this subset of firms, using the first year reporting a special item (N = 200), are 
unchanged from the primary results; in particular, SI_PERSIST is negative and significant (t-statistic = –1.86).   
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The results presented in column (5) of Table 6 decompose special items into the major 
categories of restructuring, write-offs, other negative special items, and other positive special 
items.  These results suggest that the lower persistence of special items receiving income 
statement versus footnote presentation are attributable to two of these categories: restructuring 
charges and other negative special items.  However, additional analysis is possible to exploit 
further differences that may exist within these categories.  Accordingly, we further decompose 
reported special items as follows.  We partition restructuring charges into negative (i.e., income-
decreasing) and positive (i.e., income-increasing) charges, where the latter relate to restructuring 
reversals.  We partition write-offs into those relating to goodwill, PPE, inventory, and other.  
Finally, we partition other special items into gains on sales of assets, losses on sales of assets, in-
process R&D, and merger and acquisition.  We re-estimate equation (2), comparing coefficients 
for special items receiving income statement versus footnote presentation within each of the now 
ten sub-categories.  Untabulated results reveal that negative restructuring charges, in-process 
R&D, and merger and acquisition charges presented on the income statement have significantly 
lower persistence relative to those presented in the footnotes.  Differences on the remaining 
subcategories are insignificant.  We note, however, that several subcategories have relatively few 
observations, which may limit power to detect statistical differences.25  Overall, this provides 
additional insights into the type of charges that are driving the results. 
 
7.  Preliminary Evidence on the Market Response to the Presentation of Special Items 
 The focus of the previous analyses is managers’ presentation of special items on the 
income statement versus footnotes; that is, the causes of this presentation decision.  The 
                                                 
25   For example, N = 20 for restructuring reversals receiving footnote presentation, N = 50 for losses on sale receiving 
income statement presentation, etc. 
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consequences of this decision warrant investigation as well.  For brevity, we present preliminary 
evidence on whether a key user (equity market participants) differentially values special items 
receiving income statement versus footnote presentation.  We employ the following regression:   
RETit = 0 + 1E*it + 2SI_ISit + 3SI_FNit  + it              (3) 
The dependent variable, RET, is firm i’s 12-month market-adjusted stock return ending three 
months following the fiscal year end t.26  E* is firm i’s year t net income less reported special 
items.  SI_IS (SI_FN) is firm i’s year t special items receiving income statement presentation 
(footnote presentation).  All independent variables are scaled by beginning market value of equity.   
If market participants perceive special items receiving income statement presentation as having 
lower persistence, the valuation multiplier for these special items will be less than that for special 
items receiving footnote presentation; that is, 2 < 3.   
Untabulated results reveal that while the coefficient for SI_IS (2 = 0.89) appears less than 
that for SI_FN (2 = 1.31), the difference is insignificant (p-value = 0.199).  Additional partitions 
by the sign of special items reveal that income-decreasing (i.e., “negative”) special items receiving 
income statement presentation have a significantly lower coefficient relative to those receiving 
footnote presentation (p-value for difference = 0.001); however, this difference is insignificant for 
income-increasing (i.e., “positive”) special items (p-value = 0.570).  These results provide limited 
evidence of special items receiving income statement presentation having a lower response 
                                                 
26  We do not employ a short-window event study design for the following reason.  The presentation we consider 
requires the full income statement (for those special items receiving income statement presentation) and full 
footnotes (for those special items receiving footnote presentation).  Prior research (e.g., on pro forma earnings) has 
used events such as earnings announcements and/or press releases.  Of note, these events tend to include release of 
the primary financial statements (including the income statement); however, there is generally limited or no 
provision of the footnotes.  Thus, the event in which the full footnotes are provided likely coincides with the filing 
of the 10-K or the annual report release.  This suggests that a short-window analysis would likely compare events 
based on earnings announcement dates (for those special items receiving income statement presentation) to events 
based on 10-K filing dates (for those special items receiving footnote presentation).  Because significantly different 
levels of information are released across these two events, and because our key experimental variable (the 
presentation of special items) correlates directly across these events as well, we do not conduct a short-window 
research design.   
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coefficient relative to those receiving footnote presentation, and some consistency with our 
tabulated results regarding presentation and persistence.   
 
8.  Conclusion  
 This paper examines whether managers’ presentation of special items within the financial 
statements reflects informational motivations (that is, revealing the underlying economics of the 
reported special items) or opportunistic motivations (that is, attempts to bias perceptions).  
Specifically, we examine the disaggregation of special items as a separate line item on the income 
statement (income statement presentation) as compared to aggregation of special items within 
other line items with disclosure only in the footnotes (footnote presentation).  This analysis is 
motivated by prior research on management disclosures (such as pro forma reporting), prior 
experimental evidence regarding the capacity of managers’ presentation decisions to affect user 
judgments, and standard-setter interest in financial statement presentation.   
Overall, the empirical results reveal that special items receiving income statement 
presentation are less persistent than those receiving footnote presentation.  These findings are 
consistent across a number of alternative specifications and variable definitions.  Since income 
statement presentation provides a mechanism to signal components of income having differing 
properties, our results are consistent with a correspondence between the presentation of the special 
items and the economic properties of those special items.  That is, our results are consistent with 
the presentation reflecting informational, as opposed to opportunistic, motivations.  Overall, these 
results extend prior research by examining manager presentation choices made within the primary 
financial statements, and providing evidence that managers use the flexibility afforded in this 
presentation to assist users in understanding the underlying economics of reported special items.   
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APPENDIX A  
Frequency and Magnitude of Reported Special Items: 1978 – 2002 
              
Panel A:  Frequency of Reported Special Items 
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Panel B:  Magnitude of Reported Special Items 
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Notes: 
These figures present the increase in frequency and magnitude of reported special items over time, 
using annual Compustat data.  Panel A presents the percentage of Compustat firms reporting net 
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negative or net positive special items annually for the years 1978 – 2002.  Panel B presents the 
magnitude of special items over the same time period using three annual measures.  The first 
(represented by squares) reflects the scaled economy-wide magnitude of special items, and is 
measured as the absolute reported special items (totaled across all firms) for year t as a percentage 
of lagged total assets (also totaled across all firms).  The second (represented by diamonds) 
presents the scaled firm-level average magnitude of special items, and is measured as the absolute 
annual reported special items divided by lagged total assets for each firm reporting special items, 
and then averaged within a year across those firms reporting special items.  The third (represented 
by triangles) reflects the economy-wide magnitude of special items, and is measured as the 
unscaled total absolute special items across all firms within a year, with all figures shown in $US 
billions adjusted to 2002 levels.    
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TABLE 1  
Sample Selection 
              
 
Firm 
Years 
 
Firms 
         
Available observations from Compustat Annual, 1993 – 2002     72,473    11,557 
 
Observations designated as S&P 1500 by Compustat 1993 – 2002   14,400 a      2,466 
 
All available observations for 1993 – 2002 for any firm  
   designated as within the S&P 1500 during the sample period   20,198       2,466 
 
Final Sample: 
  Random selection of 500 firms, including all available 
  years for 1993 – 2002      4,695        500 
              
Notes: 
This table shows the sample selection process.  We begin with all firm-years available on 
Compustat for the period 1993 – 2002.  We then identify all firms designated as falling within the 
S&P 1500 at any point during the sample period.  From these firms, we randomly choose 500.  For 
the 500 firms selected, we then include all available firm-years for the sample period, leading to 
4,695 observations.   
 
a  Per discussion with Compustat, there are only 900 firms classified within the S&P 1500 for 1993; this 
results in 600 fewer available firm-years than expected (i.e., 15,000 – 14,400 = 600).  
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TABLE 2  
Descriptive Data 
                   
 
 
 N 
Unique 
Firms 
Total 
Assetst 
NIt 
NIt    
(pre SI) SIt 
|SIt| /  
Total 
Assetst-1 
% SI  
Income 
Statement 
Presentation 
% SI 
Footnote 
Presentation
          
All Observations 4,695 500 8,449 207 271 (64) 2.5% 64% 36% 
          
By Existence of SI:          
   No SI 2,283 477 5,461 171 171 - - - - 
   SI 2,412 475 11,277 241 365 (124) 4.8% 64% 36% 
          
By Magnitude of SI:          
   SI ≥ 1% Total Assetst-1 1,279 400 4,951 94 296 (203) 8.3% 76% 24% 
   SI < 1% Total Assetst-1 1,133 500 18,418 408 443 (36) 0.4% 52% 48% 
          
By Sign of SI:          
   Only NSI 1,452 451 10,185 202 329 (127) 5.5% 67% 33% 
   Only PSI 349 215 8,419 342 295 46 3.3% 51% 49% 
   Both NSI and PSI 611 267 15,496 277 492 (215) 4.0% 66% 34% 
          
By Category of SI:          
   Restructuring 1,108 354 16,764 241 469 (229) 4.8% 74% 26% 
   Write-off 836 359 7,465 76 315 (239) 6.5% 61% 39% 
   Other 1,723 450 11,618 269 399 (130) 5.3% 63% 37% 
          
By Presentation of SI:          
   Income statement   
      Presentation 1,335 399 12,265 171 317 (146) 6.1% 100% 0% 
   Footnote presentation 733 309 9,274 340 383 (42) 1.6% 0% 100% 
   Mixed presentation 344 196 11,687 304 516 (213) 6.5% 64% 36% 
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Notes: 
This table provides descriptive data for the observations used in our analyses.  N is the number of observations.  Unique firms is the 
number of unique firms within each grouping.  We then report means of the following measures.  Total Assetst is end-of-year total 
assets.  NIt is annual net income before extraordinary items.  NIt (pre SI) is annual net income before extraordinary items and special 
items.  SIt is annual net reported special items, measured using hand-collected annual data from firms’ 10-Ks.  The previous four 
variables are denoted in $ millions.  |SI| / Total Assetst-1 is the absolute annual net reported special items divided by beginning-of-year 
total assets.  % SI Income Statement Presentation is the average percent of the absolute total special items (not netted) that are 
presented on the firm’s income statement in a separate line item.  % SI Footnote Presentation is the average percent of the absolute 
total special items (not netted) that are aggregated within another line item on the income statement and identified only via footnote 
disclosure.   
We present the above measures for six groups of observations.  First, All Observations is for the pooled observations.   
Second, we group observations according to the existence of special items: No SI reflect observations reporting no special 
items; and SI reflect those reporting non-zero special items.   
Third, we group observations reporting special items based on the magnitude of total reported special items: SI ≥ 1% Total 
Assetst-1 reflects observations reported where special items are greater than or equal to 1% of beginning-of-year total assets; and SI < 
1% Total Assetst-1 reflects those where special items are less than 1% of beginning-of-year total assets.   
Fourth, we group observations reporting special items based on the directional impact on net income: Only NSI reflect 
observations reporting only income-decreasing (i.e., negative) special items; Only PSI reflect observations reporting only income-
increasing (i.e., positive) special items; and BOTH NSI and PSI reflect observations reporting both income-decreasing and income-
increasing special items in the same fiscal year.   
Fifth, we group observations reporting special items based on the category of reported special items: Restructuring reflect 
observations reporting any restructuring charges; Write-off reflect observations reporting any write-offs; and Other reflect 
observations reporting other categories of special items (which include gains and losses on sales of assets, merger and acquisition 
costs, litigation settlements, and in-process R&D charges).   
Finally, we group observations based on the presentation of the reported special items: Income statement presentation reflect 
observations wherein all special items are reported in separate line items on the income statement;  Footnote presentation reflect 
observations wherein all special items are aggregated in other line items on the income statement and identified only via footnote 
disclosure; and Mixed presentation reflect observations wherein some special items are listed separately on the income statement and 
others are aggregated into other line items. 
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TABLE 3 
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations   
                   
Panel A:  Descriptive Statistics (N = 2,228) 
Variable Mean Median Standard Deviation 
SI_Sep 0.646 1.000 0.455
YEAR 1998.000 1999.000 2.722
SIZE 7.109 7.091 1.676
INST 0.681 0.693 0.223
SI_MAG 0.041 0.012 0.227
IS_DISAGG 14.659 13.000 5.332
SI_PERSIST 0.102 0.061 1.266
NSI 0.859 1.000 0.348
MISS_BENCH 0.289 0.000 0.453
BEAT_BENCH 0.051 0.000 0.211
                   
Panel B:  Correlations (N = 2,228) 
 SI_Sep YEAR SIZE INST SI_MAG IS_DISAGG SI_PERSIST NSI MISS_BENCH
YEAR –0.017          
SIZE –0.079 *** 0.104 ***        
INST 0.073 *** 0.278 *** 0.063 ***       
SI_MAG 0.069 *** 0.002 –0.063 *** –0.025      
IS_DISAGG –0.026 –0.017 0.002 –0.189 *** –0.024     
SI_PERSIST –0.044 ** –0.044 ** –0.007 –0.039 * –0.006 0.033    
NSI 0.120 *** 0.092 *** 0.004 0.085 *** –0.014 –0.086 *** –0.057 ***   
MISS_BENCH 0.134 *** 0.126 *** 0.064 *** 0.085 *** 0.073 *** –0.075 *** –0.037 * 0.258 ***  
BEAT_BENCH –0.001 –0.025 0.011 –0.066 *** 0.119 *** 0.048 ** 0.079 *** –0.248 *** –0.129 ***
                   
Notes: 
This table presents descriptive statistics (Panel A) and Pearson correlations (Panel B) for the variables used in the analysis examining 
management’s decision to present special items as a separate line item on the income statement (i.e., income statement presentation) 
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versus aggregate them within another line item with identification only via footnote disclosure (i.e., footnote presentation).  The 
sample is comprised of observations reporting special items and having available data for Equation (1) (N = 2,228).   
The variables are defined as follows.  SI_Sep is firm i’s year t absolute amount of (non-netted) annual special items presented 
in a separate line item on the income statement, divided by the absolute amount of total annual (non-netted) reported special items: 
thus it ranges in value from 0 to 1, inclusive.  YEAR is firm i’s fiscal year.  SIZE is the log of firm i’s year t sales.  INST is the 
percentage of firm i’s outstanding common shares owned by institutions at the end of year t.  SI_MAG is firm i’s year t absolute value 
of total annual (non-netted) special items, divided by beginning-of-period market value of equity.  IS_DISAGG is the average level of 
financial reporting disaggregation for firm i during the sample period, measured as the average number of line items reported on firm 
i’s income statements for all sample years in which no special items are reported.  SI_PERSIST is the persistence parameter assigned 
to firm i’s year t special items.  The parameter is derived from three steps: (1) industry level estimation (by 2-digit SIC) of year t+1 
net income before special items regressed on year t net income before special items and special items using all available Compustat 
firms, and allowing special items to vary by large versus small and income-increasing versus income-decreasing; (2) assigning the 
estimated special items parameter to the sample firm based on firm i’s industry, and the size and sign of firm i’s special items; (3) 
scaling the assigned special items parameter by firm i’s core earnings persistence parameter.  NSI is an indicator variable equal to 1 if 
firm i reports aggregate income-decreasing special items in year t, and 0 otherwise.  MISS_BENCH is an indicator variable equal to 1 
if firm i’s year t net special items cause the firm to be below any of three benchmarks (prior year’s net income, consensus analysts’ 
earnings forecast, or zero net income), and 0 otherwise.  BEAT_PYE is an indicator variable equal to 1 if firm i’s year t net special 
items cause the firm to be above any of three benchmarks (prior year’s net income, consensus analysts earnings’ forecast, or zero net 
income), and 0 otherwise.  ***, **, * indicate significance at the less than 1%, 5%, and 10% levels for two-tailed tests, respectively. 
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TABLE 4 
Univariate Comparison of Income Statement versus Footnote Presentation of Special Items 
              
 Income Statement 
Presentation 
 Footnote 
Presentation 
  
Difference 
 
Panel A:  All Observations (N = 2,228)  
 (N = 1,555)  (N = 673)    
 Mean Median  Mean Median  Mean Median 
SI_MAGit 0.051 0.017 0.018 0.006 0.033 *** 0.012 ^^^ 
SI_PERSISTit 0.068 0.048 0.180 0.101 –0.112 ** –0.053 ^  
              
Panel B:  Non-Big Bath Observations (N = 2,012) 
 (N = 1,356)  (N = 656)    
 Mean Median  Mean Median  Mean Median 
SI_MAGit 0.040 0.014 0.016 0.006 0.024 *** 0.008 ^^^ 
SI_PERSISTit 0.066 0.048 0.182 0.099 –0.116 * –0.052 ^ 
              
Notes: 
This table presents univariate comparisons of select variables across two groups of observations: 
those in which the firm presents any recognized special items as a separate line item on the 
income statement (“Income Statement Presentation”), and those in which the firm aggregates all 
recognized special items into other line items, with identification only via footnote disclosure 
(“Footnote Presentation”).  Only those observations having sufficient data to estimate Equation 
(1) are included.  Panel A includes all observations reporting special items (N = 2,228).  Panel B 
includes only “Non-Big Bath Observations” (N = 2,012); i.e., “big bath” observations are 
excluded.  “Big bath” observations satisfy the following three criteria (N = 216): net special 
items are income-decreasing; total negative special items exceed 5% of lagged total assets; and 
the firm reports negative net income before special items.  SI_MAG is firm i’s year t absolute 
value of total annual (non-netted) special items, divided by beginning-of-period market value of 
equity.  SI_PERSIST is the persistence parameter assigned to firm i’s year t special items.  The 
parameter is derived from three steps: (1) industry level estimation (by 2-digit SIC) of year t+1 
net income before special items regressed on year t net income before special items and special 
items using all available Compustat firms, and allowing special items to vary by large versus 
small and income-increasing versus income-decreasing; (2) assigning the estimated special items 
parameter to the sample firm based on firm i’s industry, and the size and sign of firm i’s special 
items; (3) scaling the assigned special items parameter by firm i’s core earnings persistence 
parameter.  ***, **, * (^^^, ^^, ^) indicate significance at the less than 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively, for two-tailed tests of means (medians) across observations having “Income 
Statement Presentation” versus “Footnote Presentation.”  
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TABLE 5  
Determinants of Financial Statement Presentation of Special Items 
              
 
Variable 
Predicted  
Sign 
All       
Observations 
Non-Big Bath  
Observations 
Control Variables: 
   
     Intercept   0.568  (  8.89) ***  0.550  (  8.16) *** 
     YEARt + / – –0.009  (–2.54) **  –0.009  (–2.39) ** 
     SIZEit + / – –0.022  (–3.86) *** –0.025  (–4.12) *** 
     INSTit + / – 0.179  (  3.99) *** 0.217  (  4.51) *** 
     SI_MAGit + 0.668  (  5.28) *** 0.916  (  4.73) *** 
     IS_DISAGGi + 0.001  (  0.47)  0.002  (  1.02)  
Experimental Variables: 
  
     SI_PERSISTit + / – –0.009  (–2.19) ** –0.012  (–2.77) *** 
     NSIit + / – 0.122  (  4.24) *** 0.107  (  3.64) *** 
     MISS_BENCHit + 0.100  (  4.45) *** 0.127  (  5.03) *** 
     BEAT_BENCHit – 0.077  (  1.53) 0.074  (  1.43) 
    
Adj-R2       0.055                             0.058 
N  2,228 2,012 
              
Notes:  
This table presents results from OLS regressions examining the management decision to present 
special items as a separate line item on the income statement (“income statement presentation”) 
versus aggregate them in another line item with identification only via footnote disclosure 
(“footnote presentation”).  The dependent variable is SI_Sep, measured as the absolute amount of 
(non-netted) annual special items presented in a separate line item on the income statement 
divided by the absolute amount of total annual (non-netted) reported special items: thus it ranges 
in value from 0 to 1, inclusive.  The column “All Observations” includes all observations 
reporting special items and having available data (N = 2,228).  The column “Non-Big Bath 
Observations” (N = 2,012) excludes observations classified as “big bath.”  “Big bath” 
observations satisfy the following three criteria (N = 216): net special items are income-
decreasing; total negative special items exceed 5% of lagged total assets; and the firm reports 
negative net income before special items.  Observations with large studentized residuals 
(representing less than 0.5% of total observations) have been eliminated to reduce the effect of 
outliers. 
 The control variables are as follows.  YEAR is firm i’s fiscal year.  SIZE is the log of firm 
i’s year t sales.  INST is the percentage of firm i’s outstanding common shares owned by 
institutions at the end of year t.  SI_MAG is firm i’s year t absolute value of total annual (non-
netted) special items divided by beginning-of-period market value of equity.  IS_DISAGG is the 
average level of financial reporting disaggregation for firm i during the sample period, measured 
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as the average number of line items reported on firm i’s income statements for all sample years 
in which no special items are reported.   
The experimental variables are as follows.  SI_PERSIST is the persistence parameter 
assigned to firm i’s year t special items.  The parameter is derived from three steps: (1) industry 
level estimation (by 2-digit SIC) of year t+1 net income before special items regressed on year t 
net income before special items and special items using all available Compustat firms, and 
allowing special items to vary by large versus small and income-increasing versus income-
decreasing; (2) assigning the estimated special items parameter to the sample firm based on firm 
i’s industry, and the size and sign of firm i’s special items; (3) scaling the assigned special items 
parameter by firm i’s core earnings persistence parameter.  NSI is an indicator variable equal to 1 
if firm i reports aggregate income-decreasing special items in year t, and 0 otherwise.  
MISS_BENCH is an indicator variable equal to 1 if firm i’s net special items cause year t net 
income to be below any of three benchmarks (year t-1 net income, analysts’ consensus earnings 
forecasts, or zero net income), and 0 otherwise.  BEAT_BENCH is an indicator variable equal to 
1 if firm i’s net special items cause year t net income to be above any of three benchmarks (year 
t-1 net income, analysts’ consensus earnings forecasts, or zero net income), and 0 otherwise.   
t-statistics are in parentheses.  ***, **, * indicate significance at the less than 1%, 5%, 
and 10% levels for the indicated one- or two-tailed tests, respectively.  Standard errors control 
for heteroskedasticity and are clustered by company. 
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TABLE 6  
Relative Persistence of Special Items Across Their Presentation in the Financial Statements 
                   
 
Base Regression
Presentation  
of Special Items
Presentation and 
Magnitude  
of Special Items 
Presentation and 
Sign 
of Special Items
Presentation and 
Category 
of Special Items
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Intercept 0.020  (  5.71) *** 0.020  (  5.71) *** 0.019  (  5.69) *** 0.018  (  5.32) *** 0.019  (  5.39) ***
E*it 0.910  (51.56) *** 0.911  (51.61) *** 0.909  (51.10) *** 0.919  (51.61) *** 0.910  (50.00) ***
SIit 0.177  (  9.90) ***     
SI_ISit  0.163  (  8.62) ***    
SI_FNit  0.296  (  5.32) ***    
LARGE_ISit   0.166  (  8.71) ***   
LARGE_FNit   0.282  (  4.85) ***   
SMALL_ISit   –0.021  (–0.14)   
SMALL_FNit   0.401  (  2.18) **   
NSI_ISit    0.145  (  7.32) ***  
NSI_FNit    0.311  (  5.20) ***  
PSI_ISit    0.311  (  6.28) ***  
PSI_FNit    0.410  (  2.67) ***  
RESTR_ISit     0.142  (  2.35) ** 
RESTR_FNit     0.436  (  2.53) **
WO_ISit     0.123  (  4.28) ***
WO_FNit     0.111  (  1.08)
ONEG_ISit     0.209  (  5.22) ***
ONEG_FNit     0.643  (  3.55) ***
OPOS_ISit     0.333  (  6.53) ***
OPOS_FNit      0.447  (  2.82) ***
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj-R2 0.441 0.441 0.441 0.443 0.429 
 50
F-Test of:     
  SI_IS – SI_FN –0.133  [5.06]     
  LARGE_IS – LARGE_FN  –0.116  [3.58]    
  SMALL_IS – SMALL_FN  –0.422  [3.38]    
  NSI_IS – NSI_FN   –0.166  [6.85]   
  PSI_IS – PSI_FN   –0.099  [0.38]  
  RESTR_IS – RESTR_FN    –0.294  [2.62]  
  WO_IS – WO_FN    0.012  [0.01] 
  ONEG_IS – ONEG_FN    –0.434  [5.62]  
  OPOS_IS – OPOS_FN    –0.114  [0.48] 
                   
Notes:  
This table presents regressions examining the persistence of reported special items in predicting one-year ahead net income.  The dependent 
variable is Et+1, or firm i’s year t+1 net income.  Across all regressions, N = 3,745.  We eliminate observations with large studentized residuals 
(representing approximately 1% of total observations) to reduce the effect of outliers. 
The variables are defined as follows.  Note all variables, including the dependent variable, are scaled by market value of equity at the 
beginning of year t.  E*t is firm i’s year t net income before special items.  SIt is firm i’s year t special items.  SI_IS (SI_FN) are firm i’s year t 
special items receiving income statement (footnote) presentation.  LARGE_IS (LARGE_FN) equals firm i’s year t special items receiving income 
statement (footnote) presentation when firm i’s non-netted special items divided by beginning market value of equity are above the sample 
median.  SMALL_IS (SMALL_FN) equals firm i’s year t special items receiving income statement (footnote) presentation when firm i’s non-netted 
special items divided by beginning market value of equity are below the sample median.  NSI_IS (NSI_FN) equals firm i’s year t special items 
receiving income statement (footnote) presentation that are income-decreasing (i.e., negative).  PSI_IS (PSI_FN) equals firm i’s year t special 
items receiving income statement (footnote) presentation that are income-increasing (i.e., positive).  RESTR_IS (RESTR_FN) equals firm i’s year t 
special items receiving income statement (footnote) presentation that relate to restructuring charges.  WO_IS (WO_FN) equals firm i’s year t 
special items receiving income statement (footnote) presentation that relate to asset write-offs.  ONEG_IS (ONEG_FN) equals firm i’s year t 
special items receiving income statement (footnote) presentation that relate to other special items charges (that is, neither restructuring nor write-
offs) that are income-decreasing.  OPOS_IS (OPOS_FN) equals firm i’s year t special items receiving income statement (footnote) presentation 
that relate to other special items charges (that is, neither restructuring nor write-offs) that are income-increasing.   
 ***, **, * represent significance at the less than 1%, 5%, and 10% levels for two-tailed tests examining whether the coefficients differ 
from zero.  t-statistics are shown in parentheses. 
 , ,  represent significance at the less than 1%, 5% , and 10% levels for one-tailed tests comparing differences across coefficients for 
special items receiving income statement versus footnote presentation.  F-statistics are shown in brackets. 
 Standard errors control for heteroskedasticity and are clustered by company.  
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TABLE 7  
Determinants of Financial Statement Presentation of Special Items – Sensitivity Analyses 
              
Panel A: Logistic Regressions         
 
Variable 
Predicted 
Sign 
Non-Big Bath 
Observations 
Excluding  
Mixed Presentation 
Control Variables:  (1) (2) 
     Interceptit  –0.164  [–0.25]   0.301  [    0.81]   
     YEARt + / – –0.026  [–1.72]  –0.043  [  –4.48] **  
     SIZEit + / – –0.089  [  8.59] *** –0.150  [–21.71] *** 
     INSTit + / – 1.151  [22.43] *** 1.152  [  21.38] *** 
     SI_MAGit + 9.874  [24.42] *** 8.394  [  18.25] *** 
     IS_DISAGGi + 0.006  [  0.39] 0.010  [    1.26] 
Experimental Variables:   
     SI_PERSISTit + / – –0.048  [–4.55] **  –0.058  [  –6.28] ** 
     NSIit + / – 0.620  [20.61] *** 0.358  [    6.62] *** 
     MISS_BENCHit + 0.799  [30.27] *** 0.796  [  27.42] ** 
     BEAT_BENCHit – 0.251  [  0.92] 0.252  [    0.87] 
    
Wald Statistic 138.42 *** 114.32 *** 
N  2,012 1,701 
 
Panel B: OLS Regressions of Non-Big Bath Observations By the Magnitude of Special Items 
 
Variable 
Predicted 
Sign 
Special Items  
Above Median 
Special Items  
Below Median 
Control Variables:  (3) (4) 
     Intercept   1.316  (19.28) ***   0.129  (  1.32)   
     YEARit + / – –0.024  (–6.61) *** 0.010  (  1.73) *  
     SIZEit + / – –0.043  (–7.79) ***  –0.008  (–0.85)  
     INSTit + / – 0.156  (  3.66) *** 0.244  (  3.30) *** 
     SI_MAGit + 0.343  (  2.74) *** 4.272  (  2.87) *** 
     IS_DISAGGit + –0.011  (–4.52)  0.007  (  3.02) *** 
Experimental Variables:   
     SI_PERSISTit + / – –0.011  (–1.78) * –0.013  (–2.57) **  
     NSIit + / – 0.031  (  0.89)  0.074  (  1.96) * 
     MISS_BENCHit + 0.008  (  0.38)  0.065  (  1.27)  
     BEAT_BENCHit – 0.049  (  1.17) –0.082  (–0.82) 
    
Mean (Special Itemsit / MVEit-1) 0.04 0.01 
Adj-R2 0.141 0.041 
N  1,006 1,006 
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Notes:  
This table presents results from sensitivity analyses examining the management decision to 
present special items as a separate line item on the income statement (“income statement 
presentation”) versus aggregate them in another line item with identification only via footnote 
disclosure (“footnote presentation”).  Across both panels, the samples include only “non-big 
bath” observations; that is, the sample excludes observations classified as “big bath.” “Big bath” 
observations satisfy the following three criteria: net special items are income-decreasing; total 
negative special items exceed 5% of lagged total assets; and the firm reports negative net income 
before special items.  Panel A presents results from logistic regressions.  For column (1), the 
dependent variable equals 1 if any special items receive income statement presentation, and 0 
otherwise (i.e., all reported special items receive footnote presentation).  For column (2), the 
dependent variable equals 1 if all special items receive income statement presentation, and 0 if 
all reported special items receive footnote presentation.  Thus, column (2) excludes observations 
having mixed presentation (N = 311).  Panel B presents results from OLS regressions, wherein 
the dependent variable is SI_Sep, measured as the absolute amount of (non-netted) annual special 
items presented in a separate line item on the income statement divided by the absolute amount 
of total annual (non-netted) reported special items: thus it ranges in value from 0 to 1, inclusive.  
For column (3), the sample includes only observations wherein absolute non-netted special items 
divided by beginning market value of equity exceed the sample median.  For column (4), the 
sample includes only observations wherein absolute non-netted special items divided by market 
value of equity are below the sample median.       
All variables are defined in Table 5.  Wald Chi-Square statistics (t-statistics) are 
presented in brackets (parentheses) under columns 1 and 2 (3 and 4).  ***, **, * indicate 
significance at the less than 1%, 5%, and 10% levels for the indicated one- or two-tailed tests, 
respectively.  Standard errors control for heteroskedasticity and are clustered by company. 
 
  
